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In this paper we study the influence of stronger intellectual property protection on technology 
transfer into developing countries via licensing. Using panel data for the post-TRIPs period 
1995-2005, we find that stronger protection is associated with increased royalty and license fee 
payments by developing countries, implying greater technology transfer into these countries. 
This result is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, as well as alternative specifications 
of the model estimated. The strong overall statistical significance of the protection variable is 
found to be driven by the sub-index of coverage, which makes eminent sense in view of the 
substantial increase in the coverage of patentable subject matter by developing countries post- 
TRIPs. Other factors of importance are scale variables such as per capita income and population, 
as well as human capital and trade openness of the technology-importing countries. The 
economic significance of the protection variable also appears to be substantial, with changes in 
this variable accounting for technology inflows of about US $3.4 billion to US $5.5 billion (base 
year 2000) in the post-TRIPs sample period. These magnitudes comprise 3.5% to 5.7% of the 
total value of royalty and license fees over 1995-2005 (at 2000 prices). Overall, our results are 
noteworthy. 
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In the wake of the Trade Related Intellectual Property rights (TRIPs) agreement of 1994, there 
has been renewed interest in the influence of intellectual property rights on various economic 
phenomena, technology transfer being one of them. In fact, Maskus (2003) points out that Article 
7 of the TRIPs agreement mandates that the agreement should also be a vehicle of technology 
transfer from the more advanced to the less advanced countries, thereby raising productivity and 
growth. The transfer of technology is a rather complex beast and occurs in several different ways 
– some indirect, such as international trade, foreign direct investment  and the movement of 
personnel,  and  some direct,  such as overseas  research and development via affiliates,  and 
licensing. This paper focuses on the influence of stronger property rights on the latter-most mode 
of technology transfer, namely the licensing of technology. 
  Technology transfer today is not quite the same phenomenon that it used to be in earlier 
centuries. With the passage of time, the predominant proportion of technology has come to be 
concentrated in the hands of multinational corporations, rather than individuals (Scherer and 
Ross 1990), and the licensing of technology has become an important vehicle of technology 
transfer between nations. According to World Bank data, the royalty and license fee payments by 
developing countries totalled almost $27 billion in 2007 (World Bank 2009). Survey evidence 
reveals, however, that owing to perceptions of weak intellectual property rights in a sample of 3 
 
developing countries, multinationals were hesitant about transferring their frontier technology to 
those countries (via wholly or partially-owned affiliates), as well as licensing it to unaffiliated 
firms in those countries (Lee and Mansfield 1996). The question then arises whether voluntary 
technology transfer
1
  The existing empirical evidence is less than convincing in establishing a relationship 
between licensing and the strength of protection, despite claims to the contrary.  Although 
Nicholson (2007) finds a positive significant relationship between the number of US firms 
engaged in licensing in 1995 and the strength of intellectual property protection in the recipient 
nations, he cautions that this must be interpreted as increasing the frequency and not the level of 
licensing activity. Even this result vanishes when he splits the sample of recipient countries into 
OECD and non-OECD groups. Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006) report weak results for the 
effect of stronger protection on intra-firm royalty payments – the index of protection dummy 
they use is statistically insignificant in four of the six regressions reported (see their Table III, p. 
336), despite an enormous sample size.
 across countries – both in vintage and quantum – has been responsive to the 
instrument of intellectual property protection that developing countries have employed, albeit 
often selectively and idiosyncratically. 
2  Moreover, while their  regressions reveal that the 
positive effect of stronger protection was significant for firms which had high patent use, this is 
only a statement that the protection variable was relatively stronger for the high-patent-use firms 
than for the low-patent-use firms, and does not imply that the effect of stronger protection was 
significant for either group of firms per se. Park and Lippoldt (2005), using firm-level panel data 
for the period 1992-1999, find the receipt of license fees by US firms to be strongly affected by 
intellectual property indices, except when the receipts are from unaffiliated sources. They do not, 
however, discuss the possibility of endogeneity bias.  Fosfuri (2002) finds no significant 4 
 
relationship between licensing (as well as other modes of international technology transfer) in 
the chemical industry and the strength of intellectual property protection that countries provide.
3 
Yang and Maskus (2001) present somewhat complex results – they find a negative relationship 
between intellectual property protection and licensing for indices of protection below a certain 
threshold, although above this threshold a positive relationship obtains. In either case, their 
results may be subject to endogeneity bias. Smith (2001) reports a weak, positive relationship 
between licensing abroad by US firms and stronger protection, but her results are based on a 
single cross-country cross-section for 1989, and she utilizes the Rapp and Rozek (1990) index of 
protection which is subjectively determined.
4  Ferrantino (1993) finds that the intellectual 
property protection variables  he uses  (essentially membership of intellectual property 
conventions, and duration of protection) are all insignificant in explaining the flows of royalties 
and license fees of US multinationals.
5 Taken together, these studies present mixed evidence at 
best,  regarding  the contention that stronger property rights encourage  the licensing of 
technology, necessitating further research into this relationship; and that is the object of our 
study.
6
  In the literature reviewed above, some studies use a single cross-country cross-section of 
data, and hence the results would be subject to the usual shortcomings of such data, where the 
protection measures vary with other country characteristics.  Since  there  is no time series 
variation, generalisations over time would also be suspect. We also noted that some studies used 
protection measures that have not been objectively computed (and are, in fact, available for just 
one time period). Such measures, based on individual perceptions, are surely likely to be subject 
to endogeneity bias. Most studies used either wholly or partially pre-TRIPs data, further 
bedevilling the issue of the exogeneity of the protection variable. Finally, none of the studies 
 5 
 
comment upon what aspect of intellectual property rights  (coverage  of protectable matter, 
duration of protection, possibility of revocation of protection once granted, availability of legal 
enforcement mechanisms, etc.) might be driving the overall result vis-à-vis the protection 
variable. Our study addresses each of these issues 
  We attempt to identify and measure the influence of stronger  intellectual property 
protection in less-developed countries, on technology transfer into these countries, where the 
latter  is captured  in terms of royalty and license fee payments made by these nations.  A 
distinguishing feature of our empirical strategy is that it draws on the fact that the developing 
countries strengthened their protection of intellectual property in the post-TRIPs period, under 
pressure from the developed countries, as discussed in detail in  section 3.2 below.  This 
strengthening,  in other words,  was not voluntary, and was therefore exogenous to the 
phenomenon of developing country technology  inflows  (and expectations  thereof)  over this 
period.
7
  Using panel data for the period 1995-2005, we find that stronger protection of intellectual 
property is associated with increased royalty and license fee payments by developing countries 
or greater technology transfer into these countries. Our results are found to be robust to the 
inclusion of country fixed effects, as well as alternative specifications of the model estimated. 
Re-estimation of the model using the component sub-indices of the protection variable, reveals 
that the overall statistical significance of the protection variable is driven by the sub-index of 
coverage. This is cogent in view of the substantial increase in coverage of the patentable subject 
matter by developing countries,  subsequent to the TRIPs agreement. Other factors  that  may 
  Therefore, variations in the strength of intellectual property protection granted by 
developing countries in the post-TRIPs period, should help identify their effect on variations in 
technology transfer into these countries. 6 
 
significantly influence technology transfer via licensing turn out to be the market-size/scale-of-
activity variables such as per capita income and population, as well as human capital and trade 
openness of the technology-importing countries. The protection variable also appears to be 
strongly economically significant, with changes in this variable accounting  for developing 
country technology inflows worth about US $3.4 billion to US $5.5 billion (base year 2000) in 
the post-TRIPs sample period. These magnitudes constitute about 3.5% to 5.7% of the total value 
of technology transfer into developing countries over the sample period. 
  Section 2 briefly discusses some related theory, and how it might inform the empirical 
exercise. Section 3 sketches out the empirical strategy adopted in this study. Section 4 discusses 
the data set, and the construction of the variables. Section 5 reports the detailed empirical results, 
and Section 6 briefly concludes. 
 
2. Insights from Theory 
Researchers point out that firms are often unwilling to license their technologies, because that 
might provide rivals a platform to develop something better (Scherer and Ross 1990). Evidence 
shows, that the incidence of licensing activity in an industry is negatively related to the ease with 
which technologies can be copied (Anand and Khanna 2000). In other words, the incidence of 
licensing by firms is likely to vary positively with the strength of protection, insofar as stronger 
protection limits imitation by the licensee and increases the profitability of licensing. By 
extension,  nations that provide stronger protection are likely to be able to purchase more 
technology/licenses, ceteris paribus, than those providing relatively weaker protection,  on 
account of this ‘economic returns effect’ (Yang and Maskus 2001).  7 
 
On the other hand, stronger protection may slow down innovation and diminish the pool 
of technology available for transfer due to the ‘monopoly power effect’ (Yang and Maskus 
2001), as well as when firms try to preserve market share (Correa 2003), and thereby reduce 
licensing activity over the longer run. Gallini and Winter (1985) argue that this effect is likely to 
be more nuanced, and stronger protection need not invariably create monopolies and limit the 
flow of information. Assuming  that  firms license their technology, they show that licensing 
encourages  innovation  when  the licensor and licensee  have similar production costs, but 
discourages innovation when their production costs diverge widely. To the extent that the former 
cost structure may obtain in certain  industries in the North, licensing between Northern 
innovating firms in these industries may well result in a larger (not smaller) pool of technology 
available for transfer. This larger pool can then be licensed to Southern producing firms. 
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) construct a dynamic North-South trade framework to 
show that stronger intellectual property rights in the South are consistent with a permanent 
increase in technology transfer to the South, within multinational firms. In general, however, the 
theoretical literature on licensing has few direct hypotheses to offer vis-à-vis the relationship of 
interest in this study, and even those theoretical results are obtained under rather restrictive 
conditions, limiting their general applicability. These concerns underline the necessity of 
empirical approaches to address the issue at hand, to which we now turn. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1 The Model Specification 
We hypothesize that technology transfer into developing countries (represented by royalty and 
license fees paid by these countries) is determined by the strength of intellectual property 8 
 
protection that these countries provide. Countries that provide stronger protection (as reflected 
by observable laws) may, reasonably, be expected to be the ones to which more technology is 
made available, resulting in larger royalty and license fee payments. Thus, royalty and license 
fee payments are made for the right to use various kinds of intellectual property such as patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, industrial designs, utility models, and technical instructions, and there 
exist a variety of arrangements to do so (Gutterman 1995). 
  As is well-understood, technology transfer is determined by other country-related, time-
varying factors as well. Thus, the size and level of development of the economy (captured by per 
capita income and population), the capacity to absorb foreign technology (represented by the 
stock of human capital), trade openness of the economy, and economic freedom, are factors that 
vary across countries and over time, partially explaining the differences in technology transfer 
across these countries over any given time span. Omitting these factors, and concentrating solely 
on the protection variable, would yield biased estimates of the influence of the protection 
variable on technology transfer. 
  In addition to the above factors, countries also vary systematically in several other 
dimensions as well; differences that tend to persist, or are relatively unvarying, over long spans 
of time. This set of variables can be quite diverse, including (unobservable) factors pertaining to 
the enforcement of legislation (including intellectual property laws), factor endowments, 
attitudes to work, whether colonized in the ‘recent past’ (and hence characterized by certain 
long-term  advantages or disadvantages)  etc., and spelling them out in totality is not quite 
possible. Since they vary relatively little over long time intervals, they are picked up by country 
fixed effects. In our specific context, some of these differences might be less important than they 9 
 
might appear in theory, given that our sample pertains to developing countries only and is, hence, 
relatively homogeneous. 
  Then there are factors that are common across countries for a given time period, but 
change over time. The global financial and economic climate, the international financial 
architecture, global economic shocks etc., are factors that fall in this category. They may be 
presumed to impinge on different  countries  in  similar  fashion, but vary in intensity and 
prevalence over time for all of these countries. 
  In view of the diverse categories of factors relevant for the phenomenon of technology 
transfer, we may express the relationship of interest as follows: 
                                                                          (1) 
where   refers to the (deflated) royalty and license fee payment by country i in year t,   is 
the strength of intellectual property protection in country i in year t, as reflected by the pertinent 
observable legislation,   represents the country-related, time varying factors,   denotes the 
factors specific to country i  that do not vary with time  (including enforcement efficacy  of 
intellectual property laws),
8   are the factors that affect all countries in question but may vary 
over time, and   is the random error term for country i in year t. 
 
3.2 A Case for the Exogeneity of the IP variable 
For this estimation to be convincing requires that the index of protection variable IP  be 
exogenous, which would mean that the strength of intellectual property protection provided by 
the sample nations should not have been motivated by technology transfer into these nations. 
This is presumably true of the post-TRIPs period, wherein developing countries were forced to 
strengthen their protection of intellectual property as per the TRIPs agreement of 1994.
9 This 10 
 
strengthening of intellectual property protection was forced upon these countries by the 
developed nations, after prolonged negotiations ending in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreement of 1994, of which the TRIPs agreement was a part. Thus, Drahos (2002) in his study 
of international intellectual property standard-setting observes that “… developing countries 
have comparatively little influence …”, the major cause of which “lies in the continued use of 
webs of coercion by the US and EU, both of which remain united on the need for strong global 
standards of intellectual property protection”. 
By all accounts,  the developing countries stiffly resisted having to strengthen their 
protection of intellectual property, partially evidenced by the fact that the Uruguay round of trade 
negotiations under the GATT dragged on for some eight years; for they feared decreased access 
to technology inflows via imitation, and higher prices of the products using protected 
technology, in particular pharmaceuticals  and agriculture.  To break this stand-off, certain 
developed countries used strong economic and diplomatic pressures to make the developing 
countries cede their position (Deere 2009, Drahos 2002, Watal 2001). Thus, right through the 
1980s and early-1990s, the United States used various provisions of its 1974 Trade Act to push 
its  intellectual property agenda in the GATT. Section 301 of the Trade Act allowed it to 
withdraw trade benefits and impose duties on imports from non-complying countries. Similarly, 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programme was amended to introduce ‘adequate 
intellectual property protection’ as one of the criteria necessary for eligibility of GSP treatment, 
i.e. preferential duty-free exports to the United States. Furthermore, the ‘Special 301’ provisions 
allowed it to place on the ‘Watch List’ or ‘Priority Watch List’ (for punitive action) countries 
that were in the vanguard of the resistance to the US proposals on intellectual property. 11 
 
Drahos (2002) notes that the European Union also enacted similar laws – for instance, the 
so-called Council Regulation 264/84 –  which, however, were sparingly used  against the 
developing countries, because the EU could not muster the adequate consensus. Commenting on 
the possibility of collapse of the GATT negotiations on intellectual property, the then United 
States trade representative is quoted by Drahos (2002) as saying that “… there are a number of 
consequences to failure. First will be an increase in bilateralism. For those of you who think 
bilateralism is a bad thing, a bad thing will have come about”. This was nothing if not a veiled 
threat to the developing countries which had dug in their heels.  The signing of the TRIPs 
agreement, and the subsequent strengthening of intellectual property rights by the developing 
countries  was, thus, determined  by exogenous pressure,  and  was  not a result of actual or 
expected changes in technology inflows. 
 
4. The Data Set and Variables 
Data on royalty and license fees paid by countries were extracted from World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2009), for the post-TRIPs years 1995, 2000 and 2005. Quinquennial data 
were used, because data on the causal variable of interest – the index of intellectual property 
protection – were available quinquennially (see below for details). The ‘royalty and license fees 
payment’ figures for each country were deflated by the corresponding GDP deflator (base year 
2000), to derive the regressand. RLF. 
  The causal variable of interest, or the strength of intellectual property protection in the 
technology-importing  developing countries,  is measured by the Ginarte-Park index of patent 
rights, which is available only quinquennially (Ginarte and Park 1997; Park 2008). This index 
incorporates five important aspects of patent laws to manifest the strength of protection a nation 12 
 
provides. These criteria are the extent of coverage (or the matter that can be patented), duration 
of protection (or  the number of years for which protection  is available under the law), 
membership of international property rights covenants  (such as the Paris convention, Berne 
convention and others),
  potential reasons for the revocation of patent rights once granted (for 
instance,  through compulsory licensing  on moral or health grounds), and enforcement 
mechanisms provided by law (such as preliminary injunctions, contributory infringement, and 
burden of proof reversal). For each of these five aspects a country receives a score ranging 
between 0 and 1, a larger score indicating stronger protection in that aspect. This yields five sub-
indices – the index of coverage (ICOV), the index of duration (IDUR), the index of membership 
(IMEM), the index of potential revocation (IREV), and the index of enforcement (IENF) – which 
are aggregated to derive the overall index (IP). This overall index ranges from 0 to 5, with higher 
values indicating stronger patent protection.
10
  Several other country-related, time varying factors are relevant in the present context, 
factors that we represented by vector Z1 in the equation specified above. The market size of the 
economy is one such factor. Thus, the larger the economy in terms of the goods and services it 
produces, the larger its technology needs and the larger, ceteris paribus, its demand for 
technology imports. The market size of the economy was captured by a country’s per capita 
GDP at constant 2000 prices (GDPPC), and population (POP). These data were taken from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2009). 
 
The purchase of foreign technology, whether for production purposes or as an input into 
the domestic innovation process, will also depend on the importing country’s capacity to absorb 
it (Nelson and Phelps 1966); and this capacity is likely to be determined by its human capital 
base. Thus, countries with relatively more human capital tend to innovate more (Romer 1990), 13 
 
requiring larger imports of complementary foreign-technology inputs. Further, given that in 
certain skills (e.g. communications) the returns are higher if others are also skilled, increases in 
human capital tend to induce higher rates of investment (Barro 1991), which might be associated 
with larger technology imports.  Human  capital  (HUMANK)  is defined as the average gross 
enrollment rate in secondary and tertiary education in the technology-importing  developing 
countries, and these data were available from World Development Indicators (World Bank 2002, 
2009). 
  How much technology is transferred across borders will also depend upon whether this is 
feasible or actively discouraged using various instruments. We capture this feasibility in terms of 
the openness of the economy to trade and investment from abroad. While none of the competing 
measures of openness available in the literature are entirely satisfactory, we use the ‘freedom to 
trade’  sub-index computed by Gwartney, Lawson and Norton (2008).  This sub-index 
incorporates various aspects of trade openness such as taxes on international trade, regulatory 
trade barriers (including non-tariff barriers), black market exchange rates, as well as international 
capital market controls. We christen this sub-index the trade openness index (TOI), which ranges 
from 1 to 10, with higher values indicating freer trade.  
  The extent of economic freedom in a country would be another factor of relevance to the 
feasibility of technology imports. One would suppose  that the more interventionist the 
government and the more controls it imposes on economic activity, the more difficult would be 
international transactions, including those relating to the purchase of technology. We compute 
the economic freedom index (EFI) as the average of four sub-indices constructed by Gwartney, 
Lawson and Norton (2008) – specifically, the magnitude of government taxes, expenditure and 
enterprises, the legal structure and security of property rights, the access to sound money, and the 14 
 
regulation of credit, labour and business. Thus, we adapt the Gwartney-Lawson-Norton index of 
freedom by dropping their fifth sub-index ‘freedom to trade’, which was used to construct the 
trade openness variable discussed above. This re-computed index varies from 1 to 10, with 
higher values implying greater economic freedom. 
  The descriptive statistics pertaining to the regressand and regressors discussed above are 
presented in Table 1. The table reveals that the average index of intellectual property protection 
for our sample countries rose substantially by more than 33% over the period 1995-2000, and by 
about 11% over the subsequent quinquennial period 2000-2005. At the same time, the average 
royalty and license fees  payments  by our sample of developing countries increased by a 
whopping 69% during the initial five-year period and a relatively smaller 43% over the 
subsequent five-year period. The percentage changes in the deflated average payments are not 
radically different. This  observation, of course, does not establish any concrete relationship 
between these two variables, and for that we require more formal analysis. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
The correlation between the logarithm of RLF, the regressand, and the logarithm of IP, the causal 
variable, is a healthy 0.53, suggesting a positive relationship between technology transfer to 
developing countries and the strength of intellectual property protection; and this observation is 
supported by the scatter plot in Figure 1. With these preliminary observations, we proceed to the 
estimation results, where all variables are taken in logarithms. 
 
5.1 Does the level of protection explain the magnitude of technology transfer to developing 
countries? 15 
 
In presenting the random effects regression results in Table 2, we follow the well-established 
procedure of starting out with the ‘base model’, and proceeding to the ‘full model’. In all the 
reported regressions we find that the hypothesis that the regressand is randomly determined is 
strongly rejected, the associated p-values being 0 in all cases. The ‘base model’ results of column 
(1) show that the index of protection variable is positive and very strongly significant at the 1% 
level. These results, however, are likely to be subject to considerable omitted variable bias, and 
so we introduce the relevant control variables in the subsequent regressions. The addition of 
GDP per capita in the column (2) regression results in a considerable change in the coefficient of 
the IP variable. Both regressors exercise a positive and strongly significant influence on the 
dependent variable. Supplementing the demand side variable by population in the column (3) 
regression further reduces the magnitude of the coefficient of the IP variable. All three regressors 
are, however, found to exert a strongly positive effect on technology transfer. Inclusion of the 
human capital variable ENROL does not change the qualitative picture; the coefficient of the IP 
variable  in column (4) remains positive and significant, although it settles around 0.9. The 
human capital variable is found to have a strongly positive effect on the dependent variable, as 
one would expect. The other variables also continue to have a positive and significant effect on 
the regressand. The trade openness index TOI included in the column (5) regression does not 
disturb the earlier results, and all regressors are found to be positive and strongly significant. 
Finally, the column (6) regression is also in line with the earlier results – the coefficient of the IP 
variable continues to be around 0.8, and all variables have a positive and strongly significant 
effect on the dependent variable, except the economic freedom index EFI, which is positive but 
statistically insignificant. An F-test reveals the joint insignificance of the year fixed effects, the 
associated p-value being 0.063, and these are therefore omitted from the ‘full’ regression As 16 
 
indicated at the bottom of the table, all regressions allow for clustering at the cross-section or 
country level.  
  Given the panel nature of our data, where the cross-section units may differ from each 
other on many counts other than explicitly accounted for by the control variables, one may want 
to  repeat the above estimations using country fixed effects. The results of this  exercise are 
presented in Table 3. Instead of discussing the results of each of the regressions individually, it 
would suffice to note that the index of protection variable IP is strongly significant right through, 
with its coefficient settling around 1.3 in the ‘full’ model. However, the only other variable that 
is statistically significant, and weakly so, is the trade openness index TOI; despite the fact that 
the hypothesis that all the regressors are jointly zero is strongly rejected for all the regressions. 
Once again, the year fixed effects are found to be jointly insignificant (p-value 0.066), and are 
omitted from the ‘full’ regression. Further, a Hausman specification test comparing the ‘full’ 
fixed effects regression (column 6, Table 3) with the ‘full’ random effects regression (column 6, 
Table 2) does not reject the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients is systematically 
insignificant, the associated p-value being 0.643.  
One is not too surprised at the insignificance of the control variables in the Table 3 
regressions, for the fixed effects estimator is a ‘within-estimator’, and totally ignores ‘between-
variation’. In our context, with data for only three time points, the latter is in fact the major 
source of variation. This, by itself, could be one reason for preferring the random effects results.  
Further, recall that the intellectual property protection variable was computed on the basis of a 
small number of factors relating to patent protection and, by definition, omits various other 
aspects of protection that may be important. To the extent that these omitted  factors  vary 
persistently  across countries, fixed effects  estimation implies that they are omitted from 17 
 
estimation, thereby weakening the signal to measurement error ratio. Moreover, as noted earlier, 
the case for fixed effects estimation is perhaps weaker in our context, because our sample is 
relatively homogeneous insofar as it comprises developing countries only. In any case, however, 
even the fixed effects results are found to be supportive of the significance of the IP variable vis-
à-vis technology transfer into developing countries; and may be seen as a robustness check of 
sorts of the random effects results. 
 
5.2 Economic significance 
Although the random effects results appear relatively preferable on several grounds, we will use 
the  coefficient estimates  of the IP  variable  from both the random and fixed effects ‘full’ 
regressions [i.e. Table 2, column (6); and Table 3, column (6)],  to determine the economic 
significance of the IP variable vis-à-vis technology transfer into developing countries. These 
coefficients were found to be about 0.8 and 1.3, respectively. This implies that a 1% change in 
the index of protection is likely to raise technology transfer by about 0.8% to 1.3% per period, 
post-TRIPs. Note that this effect (of a 1% change in the regressor leading to a certain percentage 
change in the regressand) is independent of the length of period, as long as both percentage 
changes refer to the same period. For the illustration below, therefore, we take it to hold for each 
year of a quinquennium. Given that the royalty and license fees paid by developing countries in 
2000 (the mid-year of our sample period) was about $8.85 billion at 2000 prices, this translates 
to an increase in the value of technology transfer by about $71 million (using the random effects 
estimate) to about $115 million (using the fixed effects estimate) in the year 2000. Over the post-
TRIPs sample period 1995-2005, the index of protection for our sample of developing countries 
increased from 2.080 to 3.068, or by about 47.5%. This implies that the value of technology 18 
 
transfer into developing countries on account of the strengthening of intellectual property rights 
was about US $3.4 billion to US $5.5 billion (base year 2000), in the post-TRIPs period 1995-
2005. These flows constitute about 3.5% to 5.7% of the total value of technology transfer into 
developing countries (i.e. as a percentage of the total royalty and license fees paid, at 2000 
prices), over the sample period 1995-2005. These are rather substantial figures, and strongly 
support the contention that changes in the strength of protection may have a very significant 
effect on technology transfer into developing countries. Furthermore,  the actual inflows on 
account of the strengthening of intellectual property protection might be even higher, considering 
that the dependent variable may not have completely adjusted to the change in the causal 
variable over the period in question, and the full adjustment may become apparent only in the 
years to come. 
 
5.3 Some Robustness checks: Using alternative regressors 
In this section we discuss the results of some robustness checks conducted on the exercises 
reported in section 5.1 above. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report the random and fixed effects 
estimation results, respectively, for the ‘full’ regressions, substituting manufacturing value added 
per capita (MVAPC) in lieu of GDP per capita (GDPPC). This may be defended on grounds that 
most technology transfer, particularly of the kind that requires royalty and license payments, 
occurs in the manufacturing sector. We find that this does not make any substantive difference to 
the results obtained in section 5.1 above. As before, the IP variable exhibits a strongly significant 
positive effect both in the random effects regression of column 1, as well as the fixed effects 
regression of column 2. Again,  as for the control variables, barring the economic freedom 
variable EFI all the other regressors are strongly positive in the random effects regression of 19 
 
column 1, whereas in the fixed effects regression of column 2 only the manufacturing value 
added variable MVAPC is weakly significant. 
  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 present the random effects  and fixed effects results, 
respectively, of the full model, replacing the human capital variable ENROL by the alternative 
literacy variable LIT. The results, again, are pretty much in line with those presented in section 
5.1 above. The intellectual property protection variable IP is positive and strongly significant in 
both regressions. In the random effects regression of column (3), the economic activity variables 
GDPPC and POP, and the trade openness variable TOI are all strongly positively significant as 
well, whereas the literacy variable exhibits only a weak positive effect on the regressand. In the 
fixed effects regression  of column (4),  of the controls  only the literacy and  trade openness 
variables are weakly positively significant. 
  The economic significance  of the IP  variable  is  also roughly the same  as what we 
demonstrated in section 5.2 above, because the coefficient of this variable is about 0.9 to 1.0 in 
the random effects specifications [of columns (1) and (3)], and about 1.2 to 1.3 in the fixed 
effects specifications [of columns (2) and (4)], 
 
5.4 What Drives the Overall IP Result?: Disaggregating the IP index 
5.4.1 Considering all the protection sub-indices together 
As explained in section 4 above, the index of protection variable IP has been computed using 
five sub-indices  –  the index of coverage ICOV, the index of duration  IDUR, the index of 
membership IMEM, the index of revocation IREV, and the index of enforcement IENF. The 
question of interest then is whether all five of these sub-indices are driving the results that we 20 
 
found above vis-à-vis the index of protection variable IP, or whether only a sub-set of these 
indices is the motive force.  
To address this issue, we first repeated the estimations using all five sub-indices 
underlying the protection variable, in place of variable IP itself, and these results are reported in 
Tables 5 and 6. From the random effects results reported in Table 5, we note that in the column 1 
regression the index of coverage ICOV  has a positive, strongly significant effect on the transfer 
of technology into developing countries. In addition, the index of enforcement IENF exercises a 
weak positive influence on the regressand, and so does the index of duration IDUR, albeit using a 
one-tail test. Of course, this regression is likely to be subject to omitted variable bias, to remedy 
which we add the control variables in the regressions presented in the adjoining columns. In the 
column 2 regression ICOV continues to exert a positive, though weakly significant influence on 
the dependent variable; and IDUR continues to be weakly positive using a one-tail test. The 
economic activity variable GDP per capita exhibits a very strong positive effect on technology 
transfer into developing countries. In the column 3 regression, ICOV is strongly positive, while 
IDUR is weakly positive using a one-tail test as before. Both GDPPC and POP are found to have 
positive and very strongly significant coefficients. The picture is unchanged in the column 4 
regression, where the added regressor ENROL is also found to exert a strong positive effect on 
the y-variable. Adding the trade openness index in the column 5 regression does not alter the 
picture very much, except that IDUR is now no longer even weakly significant. Finally, adding 
the economic freedom index EFI in column 6 again does not alter anything much – the index of 
coverage ICOV is still strongly positive, both the economic activity variables GDPPC and POP 
are also positive and strongly significant, and so is the human capital variable ENROL, whereas 
the trade openness index TOI is only weakly positively related to the dependent variable. The 21 
 
year fixed effects are found to be jointly insignificant in the ‘full’ regression of column (6), with 
a p-value of 0.115, and are omitted from the regression. From this set of regressions, it appears 
that the statistical significance of the IP variable that we noted above is driven by the index of 
coverage ICOV for the most part, and perhaps by the index of duration IDUR to a small extent. 
This makes good sense, since in the post-TRIPs period the developing countries increased their 
levels of protection by expanding, for instance, the coverage of their protection laws to allow 
patents in the areas of pharmaceuticals and chemicals, as well as agriculture. Further, these 
countries also increased the duration of protection to a uniform 20 years, as per the TRIPs 
agreement. 
Proceeding to the fixed effects results in Table 6, we note that the base regression of 
column (1) shows only ICOV to have a positive and strongly significant effect on the dependent 
variable, whereas IDUR  is positive and only  weakly significant using a one-tail test. The 
successive addition of the control variables GDPPC, POP, and ENROL in columns (2), (3) and 
(4) do not change this result. The further addition of TOI and EFI in columns (5) and (6) also 
produce results in line with those we found earlier – the index of coverage ICOV continues to be 
the only significant protection variable, and of the control variables, only TOI    is weakly 
significant using a one-tail test. Once again, the year fixed effects in the full model are found to 
be statistically insignificant at the 5% level, the associated p-value being 0.082, and are dropped 
from the model estimated.  Thus, the fixed effects results support the random effects results 
discussed in the previous paragraphs, in that the significance of the IP variable is driven by the 
index of coverage ICOV. 
 
5.4.2 Considering each of the protection sub-indices individually 22 
 
We repeat the regression exercises,  now  including each of the protection sub-indices 
individually, rather than all the sub-indices together as in the previous sub-section. Thus, for 
example, columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 report the random effects and fixed effects results, 
respectively,  of the ‘full’ model, including only the index of coverage ICOV  in lieu of the 
protection variable. Similarly, columns (3) and (4) report the random and fixed effects results 
including only the index of duration IDUR in lieu of the protection variable, and so on for the 
remaining columns in the Table.. 
From columns (1) and (2), we find that ICOV has a positive and strongly significant 
relationship with royalty and license fee payments or technology transfer into developing 
countries in the post-TRIPs period. Further, as in the case of the random effects regressions 
discussed in the previous sections, most of the control variables (barring the economic freedom 
index EFI) also exhibit a strong positive relationship with the regressand. In the fixed effects 
regression, however, only the trade openness index TOI  has a mild positive effect on the 
dependent variable, as also the population variable POP, albeit using a one-tail test.  
The results presented in the remaining columns reveal that none of the other protection 
sub-indices exercise a statistically significant influence on the dependent variable in either the 
random effects or the fixed effects regressions, in complete consonance with the results we found 
above in sub-section 5.4.1, where we included all the protection sub-indices together. In other 
words, once again we find that the significance of the IP variable appears to be driven by the 






The Trade Related Intellectual Property rights agreement of 1994 generated much interest in the 
influence that stronger protection is conjectured to have on various economic phenomena. In this 
paper we study the influence of stronger intellectual property protection on technology transfer 
into developing countries via licensing. Using panel data for the post-TRIPs period 1995-2005, 
we find that stronger protection is associated with increased royalty and license fee payments by 
developing countries, implying greater technology transfer into these countries. This result is 
robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, as well as alternative specifications of the model 
estimated. Use of the component sub-indices constituting the protection variable in lieu of the 
(average) protection variable,  reveals that the strong overall statistical significance of the 
protection variable is driven by the sub-index of coverage. This makes eminent sense in view of 
the substantial increase in coverage of the patentable subject matter by developing countries, 
subsequent to the TRIPs agreement. Other variables that one might consider with profit are the 
market-size/scale-of-activity variables such as per capita income  and population, as well as 
human capital and trade openness of the technology-importing countries. The economic 
significance of the protection variable also appears to be substantial, with changes in this 
variable accounting for developing country technology inflows of about US $3.4 billion to US 
$5.5 billion (base year 2000) in the post-TRIPs sample period. These magnitudes comprise 3.5% 
to 5.7% of the total real value of developing country technology inflows over our sample period. 
Overall, our results are noteworthy.24 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Data Set – Means and Standard Deviations 
         
        Full Period 
Variable
*  1995  2000  2005  1995-2005 
Royalties and License Fee Payments  7.27e+07  1.23e+08  1.76e+08  1.24e+08 
  (1.50e+08)  (2.54e+08)  (3.71e+08)  (2.75e+08) 
Index of Protection  2.090  2.787  3.083  2.653 
  (0.702)  (0.802)  (0.699)  (0.841) 
Index of Coverage  0.367  0.556  0.606  0.509 
  (0.183)  (0.230)  (0.198)  (0.228) 
Index of Duration  0.892  0.948  0.971  0.937 
  (0.177)  (0.096)  (0.075)  (0.127) 
Index of Membership  0.387  0.524  0.573  0.495 
  (0.183)  (0.187)  (0.203)  (0.206) 
Index of Revocation  0.215  0.322  0.415  0.317 
  (0.290)  (0.300)  (0.260)  (0.294) 
Index of Enforcement  0.230  0.437  0.519  0.395 
  0.308  (0.361)  (0.322)  (0.351) 
GDP per capita  1940.053  2119.171  2326.721  2128.648 
  (2292.635)  (2545.991)  (2730.092)  2515.330 
Population  48368.940  53194.130  58049.180  53204.090 
  (137647)  (150585)  (163937)  (150025) 
GDP  6.23e+10  7.41e+10  8.89e+10  7.51e+10 
  (1.21e+11)  (1.45e+11)  (1.72e+11)  (1.47e+11) 
Enrollment  28.079  34.814  40.000  34.298 
  (16.581)  (20.494)  (21.549)  (20.116) 
Literacy  69.864  73.800  76.969  73.544 
  (23.353)  (21.410)  (19.692)  (21.574) 
Trade Openness Index  6.326  6.492  6.328  6.382 
  (1.225)  (1.027)  0.850  (1.040) 
Economic Freedom Index  5.523  6.061  6.320  5.968 
  (1.286)  (1.180)  (0.954)  (1.188) 
         
Notes: 
*Untransformed variables. Standard deviations are in parentheses below the corresponding means. 
           
             Units of variables are: Royalty and License Fee Payments ($), Index of Protection (index), Index  
              of Coverage (index), Index of Duration (index), Index of Membership (index), Index of 
              revocation (index), Index of Enforcement (index), GDP per capita ($), Population (‘000),  
              GDP ($), Enrollment (%), Trade Openness Index (index), Economic Freedom Index (index). 
 
             The sample countries are: Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,  
              Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El  
              Salvador, Ethiopia, Guyana, Honduras, India, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar,  
              Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda,  
              Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia. 
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Table 2: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection on Technology Transfer 
              Random Effects Regressions: Dependent Variable – Ln RLF 
             
Regressor  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 







  (0.330)  (0.339)  (0.395)  (0.476)  (0.381)  (0.393) 






    (0.217)  (0.137)  (0.247)  (0.261)  (0.263) 





      (0.146)  (0.126)  (0.121)  (0.123) 




        (0.390)  (0.375)  (0.384) 
Ln TOI          2.019
**  2.025
** 
          (0.884)  (0.896) 
Ln EFI            0.094 




*  –2.039  –5.318
**  –5.464
** 
  (0.587)  (1.493)  (1.904)  (1.858)  (2.120)  (2.349) 
             
Country fixed effects  No  No  No  No  No  No 
HAC standard errors  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P-value (all slopes 0)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
P-value (year fixed effects 0)            0.063 
Adjusted    0.273  0.470  0.715  0.751  0.767  0.766 
N  135  135  135  135  135  135 
             
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors 
          
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 




Table 3: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection on Technology Transfer 
              Fixed Effects Regressions: Dependent Variable – Ln RLF 
             
Regressor  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 







  (0.321)  (0.365)  (0.460)  (0.474)  (0.486)  (0.497) 
Ln GDPPC    0.553  –0.101  –0.238  –0.672  –0.848 
    (0.643)  (0.796)  (0.868)  (0.907)  (1.067) 
Ln POP      1.882  1.464  1.749  1.640 
      (1.245)  (1.215)  (1.368)  (1.330) 
Ln ENROL        0.376  0.447  0.384 
        (0.565)  (0.597)  (0.617) 
Ln TOI          1.908
*  1.896
* 
          (1.121)  (1.102) 
Ln EFI            0.426 
            (0.756) 
Intercept  13.637
***  10.014
**  –2.996  0.874  –2.385  –0.751 
  (0.406)  (4.312)  (9.799)  (10.514)  (11.884)  (11.897) 
             
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC standard errors  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P-value (all slopes 0)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
P-value (year fixed effects 0)            0.066 
Adjusted    0.273  0.466  0.168  0.205  0.120  0.064 
N  135  135  135  135  135  135 
             
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors 
          
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 




Table 4: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection on Technology Transfer 
              Some Robustness Checks: Dependent Variable – Ln RLF 
         
Regressor  (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b) 
  Random effects  Fixed effects  Random effects  Fixed effects 





  (0.412)  (0.538)  (0.357)  (0.463) 
Ln MVAPC  0.678
***  1.009
*     
  (0.213)  (0.514)     
Ln GDPPC      1.053
***  –0.720 
      (0.216)  (1.096) 
Ln POP  0.734
***  1.158  0.936
***  1.147 
  (0.134)  (1.187)  (0.127)  (1.423) 
Ln ENROL  0.824
**  0.260     
  (0.366)  (0.570)     
Ln LIT      0.851
*  1.425
* 
      (0.479)  (0.808) 
Ln TOI  1.785
*  1.441  1.924
**  1.731
* 
  (0.942)  (1.152)  (0.854)  (1.052) 
Ln EFI  –0.117  –0.045  0.358  0.412 
  (0.453)  (0.825)  (0.468)  (0.797) 
Intercept  –5.819
**  –11.719  –9.097
***  –1.415 
  (2.393)  (10.463)  (2.114)  (11.496) 
         
Country fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
HAC standard errors  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P-value (all slopes 0)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adjusted    0.753  0.536  0.742  0.115 
N  135  135  135  135 
         
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors 
          
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 




Table 5: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (All Components) on Technology Transfer 
              Random Effects Regressions: Dependent Variable – Ln RLF 
             
Regressor  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 







  (1.600)  (1.626)  (1.371)  (1.190)  (1.090)  (1.077) 
Ln IDUR  2.203  2.198  2.142  2.116  1.057  1.056 
  (1.559)  (1.467)  (1.639)  (1.612)  (1.480)  (1.492) 
Ln IMEM  –0.812  –0.613  –1.003  –0.968  –0.909  –0.901 
  (1.222)  (1.064)  (0.900)  (0.832)  (0.825)  (0.851) 
Ln IREV  0.249  –0.188  –0.360  –0.657  –0.300  –0.293 
  (0.595)  (0.595)  (0.556)  (0.557)  (0.557)  (0.556) 
Ln ENF  0.895
*  0.578  0.107  –0.223  –0.158  –0.160 
  (0.492)  (0.523)  (0.465)  (0.474)  (0.461)  (0.467) 






    (0.214)  (0.142)  (0.238)  (0.260)  (0.263) 





      (0.166)  (0.138)  (0.138)  (0.139) 




        (0.374)  (0.369)  (0.386) 
Ln TOI          1.748
*  1.745
* 
          (0.912)  (0.924) 
Ln EFI            –0.026 
            (0.328) 
Intercept  13.425
***  6.349
***  –3.756  –2.850  –5.051
**  –5.005
** 
  (1.061)  (1.666)  (2.397)  (2.190)  (2.246)  (2.388) 
             
Country fixed effects  No  No  No  No  No  No 
HAC standard errors  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P-value (all slopes 0)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
P-value (year fixed effects 0)            0.115 
Adjusted    0.307  0.480  0.728  0.771  0.780  0.778 
N  135  135  135  135  135  135 
             
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors 
          
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 




Table 6: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (All Components) on Technology Transfer 
              Fixed Effects Regressions: Dependent Variable – Ln RLF 
             
Regressor  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 







  (1.613)  (1.772)  (1.639)  (1.595)  (1.458)  (1.435) 
Ln IDUR  1.837  1.773  1.837  1.842  0.727  0.715 
  (1.268)  (1.268)  (1.291)  (1.310)  (1.492)  (1.476) 
Ln IMEM  –0.354  –0.461  –0.650  –0.557  –0.373  –0.349 
  (1.213)  (1.167)  (1.160)  (1.183)  (1.113)  (1.109) 
Ln IREV  0.753  0.742  0.208  0.146  0.340  0.379 
  (0.634)  (0.631)  (0.686)  (0.722)  (0.711)  (0.724) 
Ln ENF  –0.157  –0.196  –0.296  –0.313  –0.061  –0.005 
  (0.541)  (0.524)  (0.507)  (0.504)  (0.467)  (0.482) 
Ln GDPPC    0.390  –0.274  –0.378  –0.814  –0.957 
    (0.767)  (0.918)  (0.982)  (0.991)  (1.125) 
Ln POP      2.019  1.772  1.795  1.693 
      (1.289)  (1.378)  (1.426)  (1.378) 
Ln ENROL        0.244  0.300  0.249 
        (0.541)  (0.577)  (0.611) 
Ln TOI          1.781  1.804 
          (1.157)  (1.143) 
Ln EFI            0.335 
            (0.708) 
Intercept  13.788
***  11.207
**  –3.358  –1.035  –1.023  0.427 
  (0.731)  (5.108)  (10.184)  (11.798)  (12.145)  (12.121) 
             
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
HAC standard errors  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P-value (all slopes 0)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
P-value (year fixed effects 0)            0.082 
Adjusted    0.190  0.372  0.105  0.109  0.044  0.001 
N  135  135  135  135  135  135 
             
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors 
          
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
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Table 7: The Effect of Intellectual Property Protection (Individual Components) on Technology Transfer 
               Random and Fixed Effects Regressions: Dependent Variable – Ln RLF 
 
                     
Regressor  (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b)  (5a)  (5b) 
Ln ICOV  1.936
***  2.515
**                 
  (0.739)  (1.038)                 
Ln IDUR      1.504  1.277             
      (1.010)  (1.324)             
Ln IMEM          0.362  0.791         
          (0.682)  (0.840)         
Ln IREV              0.252  0.613     
              (0.438)  (0.685)     
Ln IENF                  0.332  0.554 
                  (0.391)  (0.411) 
Ln GDPPC  0.774
***  –1.094  0.828
***  –0.391  0.819
***  –0.675  0.817
***  –0.353  0.816
***  –0.664 
  (0.257)  (1.179)  (0.260)  (1.116)  (0.254)  (1.124)  (0.257)  (1.144)  (0.255)  (1.098) 
Ln POP  0.885





***  2.304  0.900
***  2.416
* 
  (1.301)  (1.312)  (0.117)  (1.410)  (0.117)  (1.453)  (0.117)  (1.470)  (0.116)  1.373 
Ln ENROL  0.830
**  0.361  0.930
***  0.535  0.933
***  0.624  0.914
**  0.493  0.873
**  0.511 
  (0.354)  (0.570)  (0.344)  (0.649)  (0.338)  (0.643)  (0.357)  (0.688)  (0.375)  (0.650) 
Ln TOI  2.006
**  2.021
*  1.890







  (0.881)  (1.065)  0.976  (1.391)  (0.957)  (1.162)  (0.943)  (1.152)  (0.949)  (1.134) 
Ln EFI  –0.029  0.289  0.203  0.243  0.240  0.265  0.263  0.302  0.281  0.366 
  (0.302)  (0.687)  (0.405)  (0.772)  (0.434)  (0.770)  (0.398)  (0.794)  (0.398)  (0.797) 
Intercept  –4.761
*  –1.087  –6.113
***  –11.694  –5.776
**  –9.024  –5.864
**  –9.688  –5.575
**  –9.143 
  (2.388)  (12.498)  (2.273)  (11.571)  (2.450)  (12.750)  (2.425)  (11.824)  (2.460)  (11.571) 
                     
Contry fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
HAC standard errors  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P-value (all slopes 0)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Adjusted    0.778  0.027  0.767  0.161  0.763  0.120  0.762  0.180  0.763  0.122 
N  135  135  135  135  135  135  135  135  135  135 
                     
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the regression coefficients 
          HAC refers to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors 
          
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 We refer to the phenomenon of technology transfer sanctioned by the owner as voluntary 
technology transfer, as opposed to involuntary technology transfer that may occur, for example, 
via imitation. 
2 The protection dummy is insignificant in equations (2), (3), (5) and (6), in their Table III, p. 
336. 
3 Of course, whether this result would generalise to other industries is a moot point. 
4  The  Rapp and Rozek (1990) index of protection is based on a comparison of individual 
countries’ patent laws with the guidelines proposed by the US Chamber of Commerce’s 
Intellectual Property Task Force. 
5 Although Ferrantino (1993) reports that the interaction effects of the ‘patent duration’ variable 
with the ‘membership’ variables are significant, all this implies is that the effect of patent 
duration on  the regressand(s) differs significantly between countries that are members of 
intellectual property agreements and those that are not. This does not imply the significance per 
se of any of the intellectual property variables themselves. 
6 The strength of property rights might also influence the vintage of the technology transferred 
across countries, but we are not aware of any research that formally studies this link, probably 
due to lack of appropriate data, as is true of the present study. 
  Another important issue is that of intellectual property rights and the mode of technology 
transfer. There is a sizeable literature that delves into questions of substitution between the 
alternative modes of technology transfer such as foreign direct investment, exports and licensing, 
in response to a strengthening of property rights (see, for instance, Sinha 2006, Viswasrao 1994). 
This issue lies beyond the scope of our paper.  36 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Ivus (2010) observes that the erstwhile colonial status of Southern countries could be useful in 
isolating the effect of intellectual property protection – in her case, on high-technology exports 
into developing countries. She notes that in the pre-TRIPs period Southern countries that were 
colonies of Britain and France strengthened the protection of intellectual property considerably 
more than other Southern countries; whereas in the post-TRIPs period the reverse appears to 
have happened. We would like to caution that this observation may be sample-specific, i.e. it 
may depend upon the specific set of countries and years in one’s sample, which may vary with 
the phenomenon (exports, or foreign direct investment, or licensing, etc.) that one may be 
investigating. Thus, using the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights (Ginarte and Park 1997; Park 
2008)  she observes that in the period 1990-2005, the ‘non-colony’ developing countries 
increased their protection by 50% more than the ‘erstwhile-colonies’. By contrast, for our sample 
of countries, and for the period 1995-2005 (since TRIPs was signed in 1994), the former set of 
countries increased their protection by only17% more than the latter. In other words, her 
methodology may not be generalisable. 
8 Obviously, which set of factors can be represented by this variable will partly depend upon the 
length of the time period in question. Since our empirical analysis pertains to the relatively short 
post-TRIPs period, we may be justified in treating country-level enforcement mechanisms as 
relatively unvarying over this time span. 
9 Although this had to be undertaken within the implementation period of 10 years, starting 
January 1995, in actual fact countries made temporary provisions for stronger protection fairly 
quickly, till such time as they could formally amend their protection laws. 
10 Three other indices of the strength of protection are available in the literature. The index from 
Rapp and Rozek (1990), based on the perceptions of the US Chamber of Commerce’s 37 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
intellectual property task force, was mentioned in footnote 4 above. Mansfield (1993) computes 
an index based on the perceptions of a sample of R&D managers in US firms, about the strength 
of protection in a set of mostly developing countries. The World Economic Forum (various 
years) provides an index based on the perceptions of various individuals, regarding the strength 
of intellectual property protection in their specific countries. All these indices are highly 
subjective in nature, and the first two are available for single cross-sections only. For these 
reasons, they are inappropriate for our use.  